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Abstract
 
We document a significant inverse relationship between a firm’s dividend payouts and reliance 
on bank loan financing. Banks limit dividend payouts to shareholders in order to protect the 
integrity of their senior claims on the firm’s assets. Moreover, dividend payouts decline in the 
presence of monitoring by relationship banks, which acts as an effective governance mechanism, 
thereby reducing the gains from pre-committing to costly dividend payouts.  Bank monitoring 
and corporate governance (insider stake and institutional block holdings) are complementary 
mechanisms to resolve firm agency problems, both reducing the firm’s reliance on dividend 
policy.   
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The Role of Banks in Dividend Policy 
 
 Dividends have long been viewed as an effective, but costly, mechanism to align the 
incentives of managers and stockholders (see, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Rozeff 
(1982) and Jensen (1986)).1  Managers pre-commit to an inflexible dividend payout policy so as 
to limit their access to free cash flows that could be diverted for managerial private benefits, 
empire building or other inefficient investment policies that do not maximize firm value.  Thus, 
dividends can be viewed as a corporate governance mechanism.   John and Knyazeva (2006) 
show that weakly governed managers are under more pressure from stockholders to pay 
dividends, and are subject to greater penalties (in terms of adverse shareholder reaction) if they 
reduce dividend payouts.  Guay and Harford (2000) find that managers use dividend payouts to 
distribute cash flows that are viewed to be relatively permanent.  Moreover, Knyazeva (2007) 
finds that weakly governed managers are more likely to engage in dividend smoothing so as to 
obviate the need for costly dividend reductions in the event that cash flows fall.  Thus, an 
important component of the oversight aspect of dividend policy is its inflexibility, which imposes 
costs on firms that constrain pre-committed firms from investing internally generated funds in 
negative net present value investments (see Easterbrook (1984)). 
 The literature on the corporate governance role of dividend policy has focused on the 
incentive conflict between managers and equity holders.  However, this focus does not consider 
the incentive conflict between lenders and managers/shareholders.2  This paper addresses this 
issue.  For instance, lenders such as relationship banks might block dividend payouts to 
stockholders, since they reduce the firm’s cash resources available to service the firm’s debt 
obligations.  In particular, bank loans regularly include covenants that limit dividend payouts.3  
Moreover, banks act as delegated monitors in their role as relationship lenders.  Thus, the 
                                                 
1 Dividends have also been considered to be a signaling mechanism (as in Miller and Rock (1985)).  However, the 
ability of dividends to signal unexpected future changes in firm earnings has been questioned in Benartzi et al. 
(1997, 2005).  Lie and McConnell (1998) find that repurchase agreements have little ability to forecast future 
performance.  Moreover, Liu, Szewczyk and Zantout (2008) find that there is no long-term abnormal performance 
impact of dividend reductions or omissions. 
2 Knyazeva (2007) shows that debt and dividends are substitute corporate governance mechanisms, but does not 
analyze the monitoring role of bank lending.  Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2006) contrast the relationship between 
dividend smoothing policy and publicly debt holdings versus bank debt and find that firms with public debt are more 
likely to pay dividends than firms with private debt. 
3 Allen and Gottesman (2006) show that the majority of the syndicated bank loans in their sample contain covenants 
restricting dividend payout. 
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potential corporate governance benefits associated with dividend payouts is of limited value in 
the presence of active bank monitoring of managerial activities.  In this paper, we consider the 
impact of bank lending on dividend policy.  We hypothesize that dividend payouts should 
decline in the presence of substantial bank lending for two complementary reasons: (1) 
monitoring by relationship banks acts as an effective governance mechanism, thereby reducing 
the gains from pre-committing to costly dividend payouts (the corporate governance motivation) 
and (2) banks limit dividend payouts to shareholders in order to protect the integrity of their 
senior claim on the firm’s assets (the cash flow protection motivation). 
 Management can return cash to equity holders through stock repurchases as well as via 
dividend payouts.  However, stock repurchases are less effective as a corporate governance 
mechanism than dividend payouts precisely because they are episodic, non-binding and flexible.4  
For example, Guay and Harford (2000) show that repurchases are used to redistribute transient 
cash flow shocks.  Knyazeva (2007) shows that poorly governed managers utilize declines in 
repurchases to adjust for cash flow declines, but pay higher dividends when cash flows increase 
because declines in share repurchase programs have less of an adverse effect on stock prices than 
dividend cuts.  Since the corporate governance motivations associated with stock repurchases are 
less clear cut, we focus on dividend policy in this paper. 
While there is a well-established literature on resolving the bondholder-stockholder 
agency conflict (for example, see the Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1981) survey paper), the 
bank-stockholder conflict is different for a number of reasons.  First, banks have potential access 
to inside information regarding a firm’s performance, whereas bondholders generally do not.  
Second, banks develop relationships with borrowers which create costs of borrower switching, 
whereas bondholders are usually transactional purchasers.  Third, even if a bank loan is 
syndicated, the number of banks in a syndicate tends to be far smaller than the number of 
bondholders in a public bond offering.  Thus, because of their monitoring ability and large debt 
stake in borrowing firms, banks may exercise considerable control over dividend policy. 
Bank lending intensity (i.e., firm reliance on bank loan financing) can impact dividends 
via both the corporate governance and the cash flow protection motivations.  The more intensive 
the banking relationship, the greater the amount of private information produced in the course of 
                                                 
4 Hausch and Seward (1993) and Jagnnathan et al. (2000) show that firms do not have to comply with announced 
terms of stock repurchase programs.  Stephens and Weisbach (1998) document that approximately 80% of 
announced share repurchases are completed. 
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the lending relationship and the more extensive the bank monitoring activity, thereby obviating 
the need for corporate governance through pre-commitment of dividend payouts.  Moreover, the 
higher the bank lending intensity, the more power the bank has to impose its cash flow protection 
preferences on the firm, thereby lowering dividend payouts.  Thus, we hypothesize that firms 
more dependent on bank loan financing will have lower dividend payouts, ceteris paribus.  We 
utilize two independent methodologies to comprehensively examine the relationship between 
dividend payout and bank lending intensity.  First, we control for the endogeneity in the firm’s 
dividend policy using a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) approach.  Second, we utilize a 
matched-pair sampling technique to control for both bank lending intensity and corporate 
governance variables. 
We find that firms with greater reliance on bank loan financing have significantly lower 
dividend payouts.  For example, a one standard deviation increase in bank loan intensity suggests 
a 5.78% decline in dividend payouts at all firms, even after controlling for corporate governance 
controls such as insider stake and institutional block holdings.  Thus, bank loan monitoring 
complements other corporate governance mechanisms in addressing potential agency conflicts, 
obviating the need for costly dividend pre-commitment. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the database and provides descriptive 
statistics.  The regression analysis and the matched sample results are discussed in Sections 3 and 
4, respectively.  The paper concludes in Section 5. 
2. Data 
2.1  Sample Selection and Variable Description 
We hypothesize that bank lending should impact firm dividend policy. To empirically 
test how bank lending intensity relates to firm dividends, we obtain loan, accounting, and stock 
return data for each fiscal year spanning the period 1990 through 2006.5 Information on bank 
loans is collected from the DealScan database of the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC). The 
accounting data are obtained from the Compustat Annual Industrial files and stock prices are 
extracted from the CRSP database.  
For each firm, we estimate the intensity of bank lending (LOAN_INTENSITY), defined as 
total amount of outstanding loans provided by banks to the firm during the previous three fiscal 
                                                 
5 The sample period begins in 1990 because one of our variables, loan intensity, requires three years of data, and this 
data is only available on Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database from 1987.   
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years (t-1, t-2, and t-3) normalized by the book value of total assets of the firm at the beginning 
of the given fiscal year t. Loans that mature before the end of fiscal year t are excluded. For term 
loans, we carry out a linear interpolation to estimate the remaining balance of the loan.6  The 
loan intensity measure can overstate the amount of bank loans outstanding due to refinancing 
deals and/or revolving lines of credit since the DealScan database does not differentiate between 
new loans and refinancing deals.7  In addition, many of the loan agreements contain revolving 
credit lines for which no data is provided regarding the fraction utilized. We therefore assume 
50% utilization of credit lines.  
We define two additional loan related variables to be used as instrumental variables: 
IND_LOAN_INTENSITY, defined as average LOAN_INTENSITY for each of 10 industry 
classifications,8 and NO_LEAD, defined as the number of lead arrangers (value-weighted) for all 
of the loans originated between year t-3 and t-1 with maturity after year t for each borrower.   
The role of these variables will be described in Section 3.2. 
We use two variables to proxy for firm dividend policy. DIV denotes the ratio of cash 
dividends to the book value of total assets, which has a lower bound value of zero.  However, to 
distinguish between dividend-paying and non-dividend paying firms, we construct a dummy 
variable entitled DIVABOVEZERODUMMY equal to one if DIV is greater than zero and zero 
otherwise.    
We proxy for agency conflicts using Jensen’s free cash flow variable, FCF, measured as 
EBITDA minus changes in working capital (current assets minus current liabilities) minus capital 
expenditure. Capital expenditure is set to zero if missing.  Our sample consists of US firms with 
publicly traded equity.  COVENANT is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a loan deal contains 
a covenant restricting dividend payouts, as reported on the DealScan database. PROB_KMV is 
the implied probability of default, a measure of default risk, estimated using a Merton options-
theoretic model.9
                                                 
6 Term loans include “Term Loan”, “Delay Draw Term Loan”, “Term Loan A,” “Term Loan B,” through “Term 
Loan H.” 
7 Revolving loans include “Revolver/Line<1 Yr.”, “Revolver/Line>1 Yr.”, “Revolver/Term Loan”, “364-day 
Facility”, “Demand Loan” and  “Limited Line.” 
8 These industry classifications are specified by Professor Kenneth French. See his website:  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
9 Appendix 1 describes the method used to estimate PROB_KMV. This measure is a time-consistent indicator of 
variations in the likelihood of default, but is distinct from the true probability of default due to the assumption that 
asset market values are normally distributed. The estimation of the true probability of default would require 
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Ever since the Modigliani Miller irrelevance theorem, economists have puzzled over why 
firms that issue debt in order to raise capital for investment purposes simultaneously pay out cash 
flows to shareholders in the form of dividends and stock repurchases. We, therefore, control for 
LEVERAGE, measured as the book value of current and long-term debts.  In order to control for 
potential agency conflicts, we define DEBT_DUM is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the 
firm does not have an outstanding (i.e., maturity date after the end of fiscal year t) debt 
instrument with an S&P credit rating.  
We also control for LDIV, the lag of DIV, LNASSET, defined as the natural logarithm of 
the book value of the firm’s total assets, and INCOME, defined as the firm’s net income, and the 
market to book asset ratio, MB, measured as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book 
value of current and long-term debts to the book value of total assets. Moreover, following 
Rozeff (1982) we use risk levels, measured by the control variable RISK, which is defined as the 
standard deviation of market-adjusted monthly stock returns in the given year t. We control for 
taxes using the variable TAXES, defined as total income tax normalized by EBIT, growth using 
the variable GROWTH, defined as the relative changes in net sales from the previous fiscal year.  
We use INTANGIBLE, defined as the ratio of intangible assets to total assets, to control for 
investment opportunities as well as information asymmetry about the firm. We include dummy 
variables for fiscal year and for ten industry classifications, as defined by Kenneth French. 
We start with 73,342 observations for “completed” or “closed” loan facilities originated 
by 21,901 borrowers between 1983 and 2006 on the DealScan database.  This sample is merged 
with Compustat using a matching algorithm comparing the borrower’s name, as provided by 
LPC, with the firm’s name as shown in Compustat.10 We are able to identify 7,218 borrowers on 
the Compustat database, which correspond to 36,236 loan facilities.  We obtain 20,592 loan 
intensity observations following the aforementioned variable definition.  We eliminate 4,619 
observations for which dividend or control variables are unavailable.  We further eliminate 736 
financial and utilities observations (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4949). The resulting sample 
contains 15,237 observations spanning the period of fiscal year 1990 to 2006.  All variables are 
estimated on an annual basis. To avoid giving extreme observations heavy weight in the analysis, 
                                                                                                                                                             
calibration against a large sample of defaults, such as the proprietary database used by Moody’s/KMV. Please see 
Chapter 4 of Saunders and Allen (2002) for a discussion. 
10 Company names and ticker symbols are the only identifiers commonly shared by the DealScan database and the 
Compustat database.  Given that ticker symbols change more frequently than company names, we link the DealScan 
observations to the Compustat database through the company name.   
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we winsorize all the variables in the sample at the 0.005 and 0.995 fractiles except for the 
dummy variables.       
In order to measure the extent of corporate governance mechanisms, we obtain 
institutional holdings from Thomson Financial 13f filings.  The institutional holding variable, 
INSTHLD, is constructed by averaging quarterly institutional ownership data for each firm-year.  
Following Cremers and Nair (2005), INSTHLD is set to 0 if missing.  We extract insider holdings 
from Thomson Insider filings.  The insider holding variable, INSIDER, is the total market value 
of shares held by firm’s management at the end of fiscal year t normalized by the firm’s market 
capitalization.  We also utilize the INSIDER^2 variable (squared INSIDER) to control for 
nonlinearity in the corporate governance role of managerial shareholdings.  That is, Stulz (1988) 
and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Wruck (1989) 
provide evidence that managerial stockholdings align the interests of managers and shareholders 
only up to a point, after which entrenched managers utilize their control power to obtain private 
gains at the expense of stockholders and other stakeholders. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our sample, and Table 2 provides correlations.  
The mean loan intensity in our sample is 18.09%, ranging from a minimum of 1.38% to a 
maximum of 72.78%.  The dividend payout ratio for the firms in our sample average 0.67%, 
ranging from zero to a maximum of 9.27%.  As evidence of the connection between bank loans 
and payout policy, Table 1 shows that more than 50% of the loans in our sample have dividend 
restricting covenants.  Indeed, Table 2 shows that the correlation between dividend payout and 
the existence of a dividend restricting covenant is -0.16.   
The persistence of dividend payouts over time is shown in Table 2 by the 0.58 correlation 
coefficient between DIV and lagged dividends, LDIV.  Table 3 provides a univariate analysis of 
the relation between LOAN_INTENSITY and dividend payout policy. Observations are ranked on 
the basis of LOAN_INTENSITY and placed into one of 20 groupings on this basis. The mean 
values of DIV and DIVABOVEZERO are reported for each grouping.  Table 3 shows that the 
dividend payout tends to decrease as bank loan intensity increases.  For example, the smallest 
group has an average loan intensity of 1.98% and a dividend payout averaging 0.89% overall and 
49.15% for dividend paying firms only.  In contrast, the highest loan intensity group has an 
average bank loan intensity of 60.37% and an average dividend payout of 0.33% overall and 
28.78% for dividend paying firms only.  To test this preliminary evidence of an inverse 
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relationship between bank loan intensity and dividend payout policy, the next section presents 
the results of our two-stage IV regression analysis. 
INSERT TABLES 1, 2, AND 3 AROUND HERE 
3. Regression Analysis 
To test the relation between dividends and loan intensity we estimate the following 
model:  
 
DIVIDEND MEASURE = α + γ · ln(LOAN_INTENSITY) + β´ · CONTROLS + e       (1) 
 
We use three different specifications for the dividend measure: DIV, ln(DIV), and 
DIVABOVEZERODUMMY. All observations in the sample are used when either DIV or 
DIVABOVEZERODUMMY is the dependent variable, while only observations where DIV is 
greater than zero are used when ln(DIV) is the dependent variable. Hence, when DIV is the 
dependent variable, we are testing the overall relation between dividend level loan intensity. 
When DIVABOVEZERODUMMY is the dependent, we are testing whether there is a relationship 
between the loan intensity and the decision to issue dividends. When ln(DIV) is the dependent, 
we are testing whether firms base their dividend payout level on loan intensity, conditional on 
the decision to pay dividends.  
 The vector of control variables, defined as follows:  
CONTROLS = [LDIV, COVENANT, GROWTH, LNASSETS, INCOME, LEVERAGE, FCF, MB, 
TAXES, RISK, INTANGIBLE, PROB_KMV, DEBT_DUM, INSIDER, INSIDER^2, INSTHLD, 
industry dummies, fiscal year dummies]               (2) 
Where LDIV=lagged dividend payout, COVENANT=dummy variable indicating loan covenant 
restricting dividends, GROWTH=annual change in net sales, LNASSETS=natural logarithm of 
the book value of the firm’s total assets, INCOME=net income, LEVERAGE=, FCF=free cash 
flow, MB=the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of current and long-term 
debts to the book value of total assets, TAXES=total income tax normalized by EBIT, 
RISK=standard deviation of annualized market-adjusted monthly stock returns, 
INTANGIBLE=the ratio of intangible assets to total assets, PROB_KMV=the annualized 
probability of default, DEBT_DUM=dummy variable indicating the absence of a rated debt 
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instrument, INSIDER=managerial stockholdings normalized by market capitalization, 
INSIDER^2=INSIDER2, INSTHLD= quarterly institutional stock ownership. 
We perform two types of regression tests. We initially implement ordinary regression 
models, under the assumption that LOAN_INTENSITY is exogenous. We then implement an 
instrumental variable (IV) methodology to control for the possibility that LOAN_INTENSITY is 
endogenous.  
3.1 Simple Regression Estimation  
The results of the estimation of equation (1) are reported in Table 4.  As a first pass, we 
implement ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models, assuming (counterfactually) that 
LOAN_INTENSITY is exogenous to the dividend payout decision.  Since DIV is left censored 
with a lower bound of zero, we implement a Tobit estimation technique when DIV is the 
dependent variable (results presented in column (1) of Table 4).  Since 
DIVABOVEZERODUMMY is a dummy variable, we estimate the model with 
DIVABOVEZERODUMMY as the dependent using a Probit model (results in column (2) of Table 
4). When ln(DIV) is the dependent variable, we implement OLS (results in column (3) of Table 
4). In all specifications, standard errors are adjusted for the possibility of heteroskedasticity and 
firm clustering.11   
 The bank loan intensity coefficients in all three regressions are negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level or better, indicating an inverse relationship between dividend payout 
and firm dependence on bank loans.  All other coefficients have the expected signs.  For 
example, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between dividend payout 
(however defined) and firm growth, dividend restricting loan covenants, default risk, total risk, 
leverage and publicly traded debt.  In contrast, dividend payout is positively related to asset size, 
firm profitability (income) and free cash flow.  Moreover, the corporate governance variables 
controls show that dividend payout decreases when there are large institutional block holders that 
monitor management’s activities (negative coefficient on INSTHLD).  Dividend payout 
decreases when managerial stake is higher thereby aligning managerial incentives to 
stockholders’ interests (negative coefficient on INSIDER), but at a decreasing rate indicating the 
increase in dividend pre-commitment to limit private control benefits as managerial 
entrenchment increases (positive coefficient on INSIDER^2). 
                                                 
11 The results are robust to unadjusted standard errors.  
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INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
3.2 Two-Stage Instrumental Variables Regression Analysis 
While suggestive, the simple linear regression presented in Table 4 does not take into 
account the likely possibility that LOAN_INTENSITY is endogenous, which can result in biased 
estimates. That is, firms that have a low dividend payout policy (for whatever reason) may 
choose to borrow less from banks.  In order to test whether the simple models presented in Table 
4 are subject to selectivity bias and endogeneity, we perform formal tests for the endogeneity of 
LOAN_INTENSITY, including the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, 
Durbin, 1954, Hausman, 1978 and Wu, 1973) for the OLS regression model and the test for 
endogeneity proposed by Smith and Blundell (1986) for the Probit and Tobit models. Panel A of 
Table 5 reports the results of these tests. These tests all reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity.  
Therefore, we must control for the endogeneity in the level of bank loan intensity. 
To control for the endogenity of LOAN_INTENSITY we implement the method of 
instrumental variables, whereby the endogenous regressor, LOAN_INTENSITY, is instrumented 
against the controls in equation (2). The dividend measure is regressed on the predicted values of 
LOAN_INTENSITY as well as the control variables. Maximum likelihood estimation is used 
when the structural equation is Probit or Tobit. Two-stage least squares is used when the 
structural equation is ordinary least squares. Standard errors are adjusted for the possibility of 
heteroskedasticity and firm clustering.12
The instruments we use are the industry bank loan intensity IND_LOAN_INTENSITY and 
the number of lead arrangers NO_LEAD variables. The IV method requires the identification of 
instruments that are correlated with the endogenous regressor, but not with the structural 
equation’s error term. Hence, the instruments must be correlated with LOAN_INTENSITY and 
must only influence the dividend measures through LOAN_INTENSITY. Consistent with this 
requirement, the correlation between DIV and the IND_LOAN_INTENSITY variable is only 0.02, 
but the correlation with LOAN_INTENSITY is 0.23.  The economic rationale for using 
IND_LOAN_INTENSITY as an instrument is that different industries may have different 
production technologies requiring differing reliance on bank loan financing.  This would be 
largely independent of dividend payout policy, which would not necessarily be fixed across 
                                                 
12 The results are robust to changes from maximum likelihood estimation to two stage estimation and v.v., as well as 
to unadjusted standard errors.  
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industry.  That is, financing decisions would be largely dependent on industry characteristics and 
not directly related to dividend payout policy.  Similarly, John and Knyazeva (2006) use an 
industry measure as an instrumental variable. 
The NO_LEAD measures the number of relationship banks for each borrower, measuring 
the exclusivity, and therefore, hold-up power of the lead bank relationship.  The correlation of 
NO_LEAD with DIV is 0.12, as compared to 0.06 with LOAN_INTENSITY.  However, this 
univariate correlation does not represent the extent of the impact of NO_LEAD on 
LOAN_INTENSITY, since the relationship could be expected to be more complex than 
represented in a simple correlation coefficient.  That is, the larger the number of lead arrangers, 
the lower the loan intensity for each bank lender, but the more dependent the borrower is on bank 
lending overall as a source of financing, and therefore the more effective the bank monitoring 
mechanism.  Thus, the NO_LEAD variable would impact loan terms, but would not directly 
impact the borrower’s dividend policy, thereby satisfying conditions for an instrumental variable. 
We perform formal tests to determine whether the chosen instruments are correlated to 
the structural equation’s error term LOAN_INTENSITY. To test whether the instruments are 
exogenous to the structural equation we implement the Sargan (1958) test when the structural 
equation is OLS and the Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-sq statistic (Lee (1992) and Newey 
(1987)) when the structural equation is Probit or Tobit. These test the null hypotheses that the 
instruments are valid, i.e., the chosen instruments are not correlated to the structural equation’s 
error term and therefore correctly excluded from the structural equation. Panel B reports the 
results of these tests. For all three models, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. This affirms the 
exogeneity of the instruments.  
INSERT TABLE 5 Panels A and B AROUND HERE 
Further, we test whether our models are under identified or weak.13 The Anderson (1951) 
canonical correlation LR statistic is estimated to test the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
underidentified. The Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic for all models, reported in Table 
5, are significantly different from zero, rejecting the null of underidentification. The Cragg-
Donald (1993) statistic is estimated to test for weak instruments. The Cragg-Donald statistics for 
                                                 
13 These tests are implemented in the context of a linear IV two-stage least squares estimation. We are not aware of 
similar tests of under identification or weak instruments that account for Probit or Tobit structural equations. Angrist 
and Kruger (2001, p. 80) note, “Even if the underlying second-stage relationship is nonlinear, linear instrumental 
variables estimates such as two-stage least squares typically capture an average effect of economic interest…” 
Therefore, we implement these tests in our context.  
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all models, reported in Panel B of Table 5, are above the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical 
values.14 This suggests that our instrumental variables are not weak.  
The results of the two-stage IV estimation are reported in Table 6.   As in the simple 
regression tests (presented in Table 4), all coefficients on the LOAN_INTENSITY variable are 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level or better.  As an indicator of the economic 
significance of this result (using column (1) of Table 6), a one standard deviation increase in 
bank loan intensity (14.81% -- see Table 1) would suggest a 5.78% decrease in dividend payout 
for all firms. Moreover, the signs on the control variables are the same as in Table 4 and are 
consistent with theory.  For example, there is a significantly negative relationship between 
dividend payouts and the incidence of a dividend restricting covenant, firm growth, risk, 
probability of default and indebtedness.  Moreover, there is a significantly positive relationship 
between dividend payouts and lagged dividend payout levels, free cash flow and firm 
asset/income size.  Finally, the coefficients on the corporate governance variables are significant 
and the expected signs, as in Table 4. 
INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE 
We have identified two possible explanations for the finding of an inverse relationship 
between dividend payout policy and bank lending intensity: (1) the corporate governance 
motivation (banks act as monitors obviating the need for costly dividend pre-commitment to 
discipline management) and (2) the cash flow protection motivation (banks’ protection of their 
senior claim on the firm’s assets).  Table 6 provides some evidence that both mechanisms are at 
work.  That is, we find that after controlling for corporate governance mechanisms (insider stake 
and institutional block holdings), there is still an inverse relationship between dividend payout 
policy and bank lending intensity.  That is, if bank monitoring was a substitute for institutional 
monitoring or managerial self-monitoring (via high stock holdings), then including these 
variables would negate the significance of the loan intensity variable.  Despite controlling for 
this tradeoff between corporate governance mechanisms and dividend policy as monitoring 
mechanisms, Table 6 shows the persistence of an inverse relationship between dividend payout 
and bank lending intensity, consistent with the existence of the cash flow protection motivation 
for bank lenders. 
                                                 
14 The Cragg-Donald statistic is significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level of a Wald test for the 
desired maximal size of 10. See Table 2 of Stock and Yogo (2005). 
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4. Matching Tests 
4.1  Matching methodology 
Panel A of Table 5 presents results that reject the null hypothesis that LOAN_INTENSITY 
is exogenous.  Therefore, in Section 3, we use an IV approach to address the endogeneity of the 
firm’s reliance on bank loan financing. In this section, we demonstrate the robustness of our 
results by using propensity score matching to control for endogeneity.  Propensity score 
matching (see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985a, 1985b)) involves estimation of the 
propensity of one of two states (treatment or control) based on selected determinants of 
participation in the states, and then uses a matching procedure to identify firms that have similar 
propensity but differ in their participation in the states. Examples of the use of propensity 
matching in the finance literature includes Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2008), 
Drucker and Puri (2005), Gottesman and Roberts (2007), Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998), 
Michaely and Roberts (2007), and Saunders and Steffen (2008). In our context, the treatment is 
high loan intensity, while the control is low loan intensity. Hence, our method determines the 
propensity score for firms being characterized as high or low loan intensity, and then matches the 
high loan intensity “treatments” to the low loan intensity “controls” on the basis of these 
propensity scores.  
One important consideration in our propensity score matching implementation is that we 
determine whether an observation is in the treatment or control on the basis of 
LOAN_INTENSITY, a continuous variable, rather than a 1/0 dummy. To characterize a given 
observation as treatment or control, we rank observations based on LOAN_INTENSITY and 
categorize observations as a treatment or control based on its relative rank. Due to the continuous 
nature of this categorization, we characterize observations as treatments or controls using the 
median as the cutoffs. That is, we categorize an observation as belonging to the treatment, i.e., 
high loan intensity, if its LOAN_INTENSITY level is above the median. We correspondingly 
categorize an observation as belonging to the control, i.e., low loan intensity, if its 
LOAN_INTENSITY level is below the median.  
To develop propensity scores for each observation, we estimate the following Probit 
model.  
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LOAN_INTENSITY_CATEGORY = LDIV, COVENANT, GROWTH, LNASSETS, INCOME, 
LEVERAGE, FCF, MB, TAXES, RISK, INTANGIBLE, PROB_KMV, DEBT_DUM, INSIDER, 
INSIDER^2, INSTHLD, IND_LOAN_INTENSITY, NO_LEAD, industry dummies, fiscal year 
dummies + e                  (3) 
In the above model, LOAN_INTENSITY_CATEGORY is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if the observation has been categorized as high loan intensity, and is equal to zero if the 
observation has been categorized as low loan intensity. All other variables are as defined earlier. 
The results of the above estimation are presented in Table 7 for each categorization.  
The propensity score for each observation is calculated using the Probit model in 
equation (3). A propensity score of 80% indicates that the given observation has an 80% chance 
of being high loan intensity given the specified determinants. The average propensity score for 
those observations categorized as high loan intensity is 0.6081, and 0.3937 for those categorized 
as low loan intensity.  
To ensure that propensity scores overlap, we eliminate those high loan intensity 
observations whose propensity scores are outside of the range of propensity scores associated 
with low loan intensity observations. This eliminates 27 high loan intensity treatment 
observations. Matches are then identified for the remaining 7,585 treatments. 
The results of the Probit estimation of equation (3) are shown in Table 7.  Consistent with 
our choice of IND_LOAN_INTENSITY and NO_LEAD as instrumental variables in Section 3.2, 
these variables are statistically significantly (at the 1% level) and positively related to 
LOAN_INTENSITY.   
INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE 
We next match the high loan intensity treatments to the low loan intensity controls. The 
method we use to implement the matching is nearest neighbor matching. As the name suggests, 
the nearest neighbor methodology matches the control with the propensity score closest to 
treatment as the match. Nearest neighbor matching can be implemented with replacement or 
without. If replacement is permitted, then a control used as a match can be reused if it happens to 
be the nearest neighbor of another treatment as well, while the technique without replacement 
uses each control only one time. Given that our treatment and control samples are approximately 
the same size, matching without replacement would result in comparing the treatment to the 
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entire set of controls – effectively, an unmatched sample. Hence, our matching is performed with 
replacement.  
In its simplest form nearest neighbor matching identifies a single control that is identified 
as the match, NN(1). An alternative is k-nearest neighbor matching, which can be implemented 
as well, where the k-nearest neighbors are identified, and matches are performed relative to this 
group of neighbors. We implement nearest neighbor matching using 50 and 100 (NN(50) and 
NN(100)) nearest neighbors as well as NN(1).  
4.2  Results of the matching tests 
The results of the matching tests are presented in Table 8. Results are reported for NN(1), 
NN(50), NN(100), and for the unmatched sample. For each, the mean value of the high loan 
intensity treatment and the low loan intensity matched control are reported, as well as the 
difference, significance, and standard deviation. These results are reported for both the DIV and 
DIVABOVEZERODUMMY variables.  Table 8 shows that there is a statistically significant (at 
the 5% level or better) inverse relationship between both overall dividend payout and the dummy 
variable specifications and loan intensity under all matching methodologies.   
INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE 
 The results of the matching tests are also consistent with the two-stage IV analysis in 
terms of the two hypothesized motivations for the inverse relationship between dividend payout 
and bank lending intensity: the corporate governance motivation and the cash flow protection 
motivation.  We incorporate corporate governance variables in our propensity score estimation 
performed to match the observations in the sample.  As shown in Table 7, institutional block 
holding (INSTHLD) corporate governance mechanisms had a statistically significant (at the 1% 
level) positive impact on the propensity score.  Even after taking that into account, Table 8 
shows a statistically significant (at the 5% level or better) inverse relationship between loan 
intensity and dividend payout policy, suggesting a complementary role for corporate governance 
mechanisms and bank monitoring in determining corporate dividend policies. 
5. Conclusion 
We document the inverse relationship between dividend payout policy and the dependence of 
the firm on bank financing.  That is, the more reliant a firm is on bank loans, the lower their 
dividend payout, ceteris paribus.  We identify two complementary reasons for this effect.  (1) 
monitoring by relationship banks acts as an effective governance mechanism, thereby reducing 
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the gains from pre-committing to costly dividend payouts (the corporate governance motivation) 
and (2) banks limit dividend payouts to shareholders in order to protect the integrity of their 
senior claim on the firm’s assets (the cash flow protection motivation).  The inverse relationship 
persists even after controlling for corporate governance mechanisms such as insider stake and 
institutional block holdings, suggesting that both motivations impact corporate dividend policies.   
We employ two independent methodologies in order to test the robustness of this result.  We 
utilize a two-stage instrumental variables analysis in order to control for the endogeneity in 
dividend payout policy.  Moreover, we utilize a matched pair sampling technique to further 
investigate the relationship between dividend payout policy and bank lending intensity.  The 
inverse relationship between dividend payout and bank lending intensity is robust to all 
methodologies and variable definitions. 
 17
Appendix 1: Estimation of the Implied Probability of Default  
 
The implied probability of default is estimated as follows:  
 
(it it )IDP N DD= −            (A1) 
 
where 
 
[ ] TrTLVDD AitAittitAitit σσ /)5.0()/ln( 2++= .       (A2) 
 
VAit is the firm’s asset value, σAit is the firm’s volatility, and the parameter μ is estimated through 
calculating the average change in log(VAit), and represents the instantaneous drift of VA. We 
identify VAit and σAit using Newton’s nonlinear approximation technique to solve the following 
system of equations: 
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where N( ) is the normal distribution, 
 
2
1 [ln( ) ( 0.5 )]it Ait it t Ait AitD V L T r Tσ σ= + + ,       (A5) 
2 1ti ti AitD D σ= − T ,           (A6) 
VEit is the borrower i’s equity market value at time t, measured as the product of the 
borrower’s stock price and shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year t; Lit is the borrower’s total 
liabilities; rt is the risk free rate, proxied by the rate of return on three-month Treasury bills.; σEit 
is the equity volatility, estimated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in fiscal year t; 
and T is the one year estimation period. We then convert the daily equity volatility into an annual 
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measure by assuming that there are 252 trading days in a year.  To be included in the estimation, 
each borrower must have at least 200 daily returns.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. The number of observations, the mean minimum, maximum, and standard 
deviation are reported for the variables used in this study. LOAN_INTENSITY is the total amount of loans 
outstanding provided by banks to the given firm during the previous three fiscal years normalized by the book value 
of total assets of the firm at the beginning of the given fiscal year t. IND_LOAN_INTENSITY is the average 
LOAN_INTENSITY for the given firm’s industry. NO_LEAD is the value-weighted number of leading arrangers of 
loans originated between year t-3 and t-1 with maturity after year t. DIV is the ratio of cash dividends to the book 
value of total assets. LDIV is the lag of DIV. DIVABOVEZERO is equal to DIV if DIV is greater than zero and set 
to missing otherwise. DIVABOVEZERODUMMY is a dummy variable equal to zero if DIV is greater than zero 
and zero otherwise. COVENANT is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a loan deal contains any dividend 
covenant reported on the DealScan database. GROWTH is the relative changes in net sales from the previous fiscal 
year. LNASSET is defined as the natural logarithm of the book value of the firm’s total assets. INCOME is the 
given firm’s net income. LEVERAGE is the book value of current and long-term debts. FCF is EBITDA minus 
changes in working capital (current assets minus current liabilities) minus capital expenditure. MB is the ratio of the 
market value of equity plus the book value of current and long-term debts to the book value of total assets. TAXES 
is total income tax normalized by EBIT. RISK is the standard deviation of market-adjusted monthly stock returns in 
the given year t. INTANGIBLE is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. PROB_KMV is the implied 
probability of default. DEBT_DUM is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm does not have a debt 
instrument with an S&P credit rating and a maturity date after the end of fiscal year t. INSTHLD is institutional 
holding variable, constructed by averaging quarterly institutional ownership data for each year.  INSIDER is the 
natural logarithm of total market value of shares held by firm’s management at the end of fiscal year t.  
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
LOAN_INTENSITY 0.1809 0.0138 0.7278 0.1481 
IND_LOAN_INTENSITY 0.1809 0.1155 0.3196 0.0348 
NO_LEAD 0.5276 0.0000 2.4849 0.7188 
DIV 0.0067 0.0000 0.0927 0.0133 
LDIV 0.0086 0.0000 0.2212 0.0226 
DIVABOVEZERODUMMY 0.4070 0.0000 1.0000 0.4913 
COVENANT 0.5040 0.0000 1.0000 0.5000 
GROWTH 0.1655 -0.6325 2.7621 0.3724 
LNASSET 6.1454 3.1335 10.4003 1.6208 
INCOME 0.0087 -0.8235 0.2766 0.1319 
LEVERAGE 0.3010 0.0000 1.1223 0.2073 
FCF 0.0479 -0.6376 0.6603 0.1469 
MB 1.3817 0.2303 8.4696 1.0530 
TAXES 0.1941 -6.1395 5.5610 0.8073 
RISK 0.1328 0.0315 0.5480 0.0778 
INTANGIBLE 0.1367 0.0000 0.7572 0.1742 
PROB_KMV 0.0293 0.0000 0.6062 0.0864 
DEBT_DUM 0.2913 0.0000 1.0000 0.4544 
INSIDER 0.0880 0.0000 2.9053 0.2984 
INSTHLD 0.4747 0.0010 0.9657 0.2547 
 
Table 2: Correlations. Correlations between the variables in our sample. Correlations in bold are statistically significant at the 10% level or better. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
 LOAN_INTENSITY (1)                   
IND_LOAN_INTENSITY (2) 0.23                   
NO_LEAD (3) 0.06 0.04                  
DIV (4) (0.13) 0.02 0.12                 
LDIV (5) (0.04) 0.02 0.05 0.58                
DIVABOVEZERODUMMY (6) (0.14) 0.05 0.19 0.61 0.34               
COVENANT (7) 0.22 0.10 0.18 (0.16) (0.11) (0.17)              
GROWTH (8) 0.06 0.09 (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08) 0.05             
LNASSET (9) (0.19) 0.05 0.64 0.28 0.13 0.39 0.01 0.00            
INCOME (10) (0.02) (0.06) 0.08 0.19 0.15 0.18 (0.05) 0.10 0.19           
LEVERAGE (11) 0.30 0.30 0.12 (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) 0.07 0.02 0.08 (0.27)          
FCF (12) 0.04 (0.05) 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.12 (0.00) (0.15) 0.10 0.12 0.06         
MB (13) (0.06) (0.08) (0.00) 0.13 0.12 (0.03) (0.01) 0.19 0.03 0.21 (0.18) 0.00        
TAXES (14) (0.02) (0.02) 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 0.02 0.10 (0.08) 0.04 0.05       
RISK (15) 0.11 0.10 (0.17) (0.30) (0.17) (0.35) 0.15 0.02 (0.34) (0.38) 0.12 (0.13) (0.01) (0.06)      
INTANGIBLE (16) 0.14 0.02 0.23 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 0.18 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.12 0.18 (0.00) 0.02 (0.01)     
 
 
PROB_KMV (17) 0.12 0.10 (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.18) 0.05 (0.10) (0.20) (0.41) 0.34 0.07 (0.21) (0.06) 0.51 0.01   
DEBT_DUM (18) (0.04) (0.01) 0.35 0.03 (0.00) 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.39 0.01 0.18 0.02 (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) 0.12 (0.02)  
 INSIDER (19) 0.00 (0.01) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) 0.04 0.02 (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 0.06 0.01 0.08 (0.03) 0.04 (0.06)
INSTHLD (20) (0.11) (0.10) 0.41 0.07 0.00 0.19 0.11 0.01 0.57 0.24 (0.16) 0.08 0.18 0.05 (0.31) 0.14 (0.31) 0.28 (0.11)
Table 3: Univariate relation between loan intensity and dividends. Observations are ranked on the basis of LOAN_INTENSITY and placed into one of 20 
groupings on this basis. The mean values of DIV and DIVABOVEZERO are reported for each grouping. 
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LOAN_INTENSITY  
GROUP N 
MEAN  
LOAN_INTENSITY MEAN DIV 
MEAN  
DIVABOVEZERODUMMY 
1 761       0.0198       0.0089       0.4915 
2 762       0.0331       0.0081       0.4843 
3 762       0.0442       0.0095       0.5367 
4 762       0.0552       0.0089       0.5026 
5 762       0.0660       0.0097       0.5144 
6 762       0.0767       0.0080       0.4672 
7 762       0.0885       0.0081       0.4672 
8 762       0.1006       0.0071       0.4318 
9 762       0.1137       0.0085       0.4646 
10 761       0.1281       0.0073       0.4074 
11 762       0.1445       0.0064       0.4094 
12 762       0.1629       0.0065       0.3871 
13 762       0.1830       0.0064       0.3898 
14 762       0.2057       0.0055       0.3766 
15 762       0.2322       0.0046       0.3136 
16 762       0.2634       0.0042       0.3215 
17 762       0.3016       0.0041       0.2992 
18 762       0.3545       0.0042       0.2769 
19 762       0.4403       0.0039       0.3110 
      0.2878 20 761       0.6037       0.0033 
 
 
Table 4: Simple Regression Estimation. The relation between dividends and loan intensity is tested using the following 
model: DIVIDEND MEASURE = α + γ · ln(LOAN_INTENSITY) + β´ · CONTROLS + e, where CONTROLS = [LDIV, 
COVENANT, GROWTH, LNASSETS, INCOME, LEVERAGE, FCF, MB, TAXES, RISK, INTANGIBLE, PROB_KMV, 
DEBT_DUM, INSIDER, INSIDER_SQ, INSTHLD, industry dummies, fiscal year dummies]. Three separate specifications 
of the dividend measure are DIV, ln(DIV), and DIVABOVEZERODUMMY. LOAN_INTENSITY is assumed to be 
exogenous. All observations in the sample are used when either DIV or DIVABOVEZERODUMMY is the dependent 
variable, while only observations where DIV is greater than zero are used when ln(DIV) is the dependent. Tobit estimation is 
implemented when DIV is the dependent variable. Probit estimation when DIVABOVEZERODUMMY is the dependent. 
When ln(DIV) is the dependent, we implement ordinary least squares. Standard errors are adjusted for the possibility of 
heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. Significance levels are indicated by *, ** and *** that represent 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Sample All obs. DIV > 0 All obs. 
Model Tobit OLS Probit 
Dependent DIV ln(DIV) DIV>0 dummy 
LOG_LOAN_INTENSITY -0.0011*** -0.0431* -0.0734*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0222) (0.0239) 
LDIV 0.3726*** 19.0027*** 15.7050*** 
 (0.0225) (1.6832) (1.4786) 
COVENANT -0.0033*** -0.1508*** -0.2483*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0392) (0.0428) 
GROWTH -0.0044*** -0.4444*** -0.1683*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0583) (0.0436) 
LNASSET 0.0038*** 0.0642*** 0.3166*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0169) (0.0203) 
INCOME 0.0088*** 0.095 0.3409** 
 (0.0031) (0.2738) (0.1675) 
LEVERAGE -0.0035* -0.8307*** -0.3521*** 
 (0.0020) (0.1514) (0.1225) 
FCF 0.0190*** 0.9271*** 0.6647*** 
 (0.0022) (0.1810) (0.1143) 
MB 0.0011*** 0.0870*** -0.0541** 
 (0.0004) (0.0327) (0.0239) 
TAXES 0.0003 0.0276 0.0063 
 (0.0002) (0.0243) (0.0164) 
RISK -0.0759*** -3.6420*** -3.8768*** 
 (0.0064) (0.4353) (0.3697) 
INTANGIBLE -0.0064*** -0.2304 -0.2091 
 (0.0019) (0.1624) (0.1397) 
PROB_KMV -0.0134*** -0.5114 -0.6911** 
 (0.0050) (0.3778) (0.2902) 
DEBT_DUM -0.0015** -0.1169*** -0.1160** 
 (0.0006) (0.0423) (0.0482) 
INSIDER -0.0070*** -0.6259*** -0.1606 
 (0.0022) (0.2108) (0.1388) 
INSIDER^2 0.0014* 0.2147*** 0.0028 
 (0.0008) (0.0776) (0.0566) 
INSTHLD -0.0092*** -0.4488*** -0.2123* 
 (0.0017) (0.1242) (0.1124) 
_cons -0.0145*** -4.6100*** -1.6159*** 
 (0.0026) (0.1679) (0.1843) 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES 
Chi-square 1,816.83  1,216.71 
R-square  0.3688  
N 15,237 6,202 15,237 
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Table 5: Tests of endogeneity and instruments. Panel A tests endogeneity of LOAN_INTENSITY in the regression 
estimation DIVIDEND MEASURE = α + γ · ln(LOAN_INTENSITY) + β´ · CONTROLS + e. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, Durbin, 1954, Hausman, 1978 and Wu, 1973) is implemented for the OLS regression 
model and Smith and Blundell (1986) for the Probit and Tobit models. Panel B tests whether the instruments used in the 
method of instrumental variables, IND_LOAN_INTENSITY and NO_LEAD, are exogenous to the structural equation. The 
Sargan (1958) test is performed when the structural equation is OLS and the Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-sq statistic 
(Lee (1992) and Newey (1987)) when the structural equation is Probit or Tobit. The Anderson (1951) canonical correlation 
LR statistic is estimated to test whether the instruments are underidentified. The Cragg-Donald (1993) statistic is estimated to 
test for weak instruments, and the statistic is compared to the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values.  
 
Panel A 
 DIV ln(DIV) DIVABOVEZERODUMMY
Smith-Blundell statistic 11.433  4.271 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic  4.658  
P-value 0.000 0.031 0.039 
 
Panel B 
 DIV ln(DIV) DIVABOVEZERODUMMY
Amemiya-Lee-Newey 0.465  0.800 
Sargan statistic  0.024  
P-value 0.4955 0.876 0.371 
Anderson canonical correlation LM statistic 952.602 346.121 952.602 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.0000 
Cragg-Donald statistic 506.729 182.068 506.729 
Stock Yogo critical values, maximal size of 
10, of a 5% Wald test 19.93 19.93 19.93 
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Table 6: Method of Instrumental Variables. The relation between dividends and loan intensity is tested using the following 
model: DIVIDEND MEASURE = α + γ · ln(LOAN_INTENSITY) + β´ · CONTROLS + e, where CONTROLS = [LDIV, 
COVENANT, GROWTH, LNASSETS, INCOME, LEVERAGE, FCF, MB, TAXES, RISK, INTANGIBLE, PROB_KMV, 
DEBT_DUM, INSIDER, INSIDER_SQ, INSTHLD, industry dummies, fiscal year dummies]. Three separate specifications 
of the dividend measure are DIV, ln(DIV), and DIVABOVEZERODUMMY. LOAN_INTENSITY is assumed to be 
endogenous. The method of instrumental variables is implemented where the instrumental variables are 
IND_LOAN_INTENSITY and NO_LEAD. All observations in the sample are used when either DIV or 
DIVABOVEZERODUMMY is the dependent variable, while only observations where DIV is greater than zero are used 
when ln(DIV) is the dependent. IV Tobit estimation is implemented when DIV is the dependent variable. IV Probit 
estimation when DIVABOVEZERODUMMY is the dependent. When ln(DIV) is the dependent, we implement ordinary IV. 
Standard errors are adjusted for the possibility of heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. Significance levels are indicated by 
*, ** and *** that represent 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Sample All obs. DIV > 0 All obs. 
Model IV tobit IV IV probit 
Dependent DIV Ln(DIV) DIV>0 dummy 
LOG_LOAN_INTENSITY -0.0039*** -0.1988** -0.2008** 
 (0.0012) (0.0945) (0.0949) 
LDIV 0.3734*** 18.9853*** 15.6634*** 
 (0.0224) (1.6519) (1.4664) 
COVENANT -0.0020*** -0.0873* -0.1873*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0514) (0.0589) 
GROWTH -0.0044*** -0.4296*** -0.1651*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0598) (0.0436) 
LNASSET 0.0033*** 0.0331 0.2925*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0255) (0.0278) 
INCOME 0.0108*** 0.1346 0.4299** 
 (0.0032) (0.2745) (0.1816) 
LEVERAGE -0.0004 -0.6657*** -0.214 
 (0.0024) (0.1783) (0.1599) 
FCF 0.0197*** 0.9799*** 0.6885*** 
 (0.0022) (0.1838) (0.1160) 
MB 0.0010*** 0.0847*** -0.0590** 
 (0.0004) (0.0324) (0.0241) 
TAXES 0.0003 0.0308 0.0069 
 (0.0003) (0.0242) (0.0165) 
RISK -0.0748*** -3.5008*** -3.8133*** 
 (0.0064) (0.4488) (0.3729) 
INTANGIBLE -0.0046** -0.1325 -0.1202 
 (0.0021) (0.1803) (0.1492) 
PROB_KMV -0.0152*** -0.6833* -0.7631*** 
 (0.0050) (0.3613) (0.2908) 
DEBT_DUM -0.0016*** -0.1199*** -0.1177** 
 (0.0006) (0.0421) (0.0482) 
INSIDER -0.0070*** -0.6573*** -0.1633 
 (0.0022) (0.2143) (0.1379) 
INSIDER^2 0.0014* 0.2209*** 0.003 
 (0.0008) (0.0784) (0.0562) 
INSTHLD -0.0085*** -0.4215*** -0.1789 
 (0.0017) (0.1247) (0.1144) 
_cons -0.0196*** -4.8754*** -1.8452*** 
 (0.0032) (0.2240) (0.2372) 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES 
Chi-square 1,797.96  1,235.15 
R-square  0.362  
N 15,237 6,202 15,237 
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Table 7: Loan intensity propensity score Probit estimation. The propensity of falling into a high loan intensity 
category is determined through Probit estimation of the following model: LOAN_INTENSITY_CATEGORY = LDIV, 
COVENANT, GROWTH, LNASSETS, INCOME, LEVERAGE, FCF, MB, TAXES, RISK, INTANGIBLE, 
PROB_KMV, DEBT_DUM, INSIDER, INSIDER_SQ, INSTHLD, IND_LOAN_INTENSITY, NO_LEAD, industry 
dummies, fiscal year dummies + e. LOAN_INTENSITY_CATEGORY is a 1/0 dummy formed as follows: observations 
are ranked based on LOAN_INTENSITY and observations are categorized as belonging in the high or low loan intensity 
category based on their relative rank. Observations are characterized as high or low loan intensity using the median. 
Significance levels are indicated by *, ** and *** that represent 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Loan intensity category propensity 
LDIV 0.5412 
 (0.5133) 
COVENANT 0.5865*** 
 (0.0274) 
GROWTH 0.0998*** 
 (0.0323) 
LNASSET -0.3914*** 
 (0.0117) 
INCOME 0.9745*** 
 (0.0995) 
LEVERAGE 1.4681*** 
 (0.0658) 
FCF 0.2520*** 
 (0.0807) 
MB -0.0594*** 
 (0.0124) 
TAXES -0.0076 
 (0.0138) 
RISK 0.6334*** 
 (0.1954) 
INTANGIBLE 0.8325*** 
 (0.0731) 
PROB_KMV -0.5931*** 
 (0.1658) 
DEBT_DUM -0.1122*** 
 (0.0279) 
INSIDER 0.1192 
 (0.0940) 
INSIDER^2 -0.0524 
 (0.0396) 
INSTHLD 0.2643*** 
 (0.0593) 
IND_LOAN_INTENSITY 5.7951*** 
 (0.7904) 
NO_LEAD 0.5450*** 
 (0.0233) 
_cons -0.0884 
 (0.1870) 
Year dummies YES 
Industry dummies YES 
Chi-square 3,604.59 
N 15,237 
Table 8: Matched tests. Propensity scores are used to identify matches between observations characterized as 
high and low loan intensity. Observations are characterized as high or low loan intensity using the median. To 
ensure that propensity scores overlap, those high loan intensity observations whose propensity scores are 
outside of the range of propensity scores associated with low loan intensity observations are eliminated. Nearest 
neighbor matching with replacement is implemented using k-nearest neighbors, where k is defined as 1, 50, and 
100 (NN(1), NN(50), and NN(100), respectively). For values of DIV and DIV 1/0 dummy are reported for the 
aggregate of the high and low loan intensity matched pairs, as well as the difference and standard error. 
Significance levels are indicated by *, ** and *** that represent 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  DIV DIV 1/0 dummy 
NN(1) higher loan intensity 0.0049 0.3371 
 lower loan intensity 0.0060 0.3632 
 Difference -0.0011*** -.0261** 
  standard error (0.0004) (0.0139) 
NN(50) higher loan intensity 0.0049 0.3371 
 lower loan intensity 0.0060 0.3644 
 Difference -0.0011*** -0.0273** 
  standard error (0.0003) (0.0108) 
NN(100) higher loan intensity 0.0049 0.3371 
 lower loan intensity 0.0059 0.3661 
 Difference -0.0010*** -0.0290*** 
  standard error (0.0003) (0.0106) 
Unmatched higher loan intensity 0.0049 0.3367 
 lower loan intensity 0.0084 0.4759 
 difference -0.0035*** -0.1392*** 
  standard error (0.0002) (0.0079) 
 
  
 
